Optimal Control in a Multiagent Opinion Dynamic System

Authors

  • Jingjing Gao Saint Petersburg State University
  • Elena Parilina Saint Petersburg State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.05

Abstract

The paper considers a multiagent system of opinion dynamics modeling a finite social network opinion transformation. In the system, there is an influencer or a player who is interested in making the agents' opinions in the system close to the target opinion. We assume that the player can influence the system only at a limited number of time periods. The player minimizes his costs by selecting moments to control the multiagent system at these moments, while at any time period he observes the agents' opinions. The optimization problem is solved using the Euler-equation approach. The numerical simulations represent the proposed method of finding the optimal solution of the problem.

Keywords:

multiagent system, opinion dynamics, linear-quadratic games, Euler-equation approach

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References

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Published

2023-01-25

How to Cite

Gao, J., & Parilina, E. (2023). Optimal Control in a Multiagent Opinion Dynamic System. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15, 51–59. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.05

Issue

Vol. 15 (2022)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.