Two-Stage Network Formation Game with Heterogeneous Players and Private Information

Authors

  • Ping Sun Saint Petersburg State University; Qingdao University
  • Elena Parilina Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

We consider a two-stage network formation game with heterogeneous players and private information. The player set consists of a leader and a finite number of other common players, which are divided into two types, passive and positive players. At the first stage, the leader suggests a connected communication network for all players to join. While it is assumed that the link information which every common player receives from the leader is private. Based on the private information, every player chooses the action, accept or reject, at the second stage. A network is formed finally. We show the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game. The result is illustrated by an example.

Keywords:

heterogeneous players, private information, Myerson value, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Jackson, M. and A. Wolinsky (1996). A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1), 44–74.

Bala, V. and S. Goyal (2000). A non-cooperative model of network formation. Econometrica, 68(5), 1181–1231.

Avrachenkov, K., J. Elias, F. Martignon, G. Neglia and L.A. Petrosyan (2011). A Nash bargaining solution for cooperative network formation games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6640, 307–318.

Larrosa, J. and F. Tohme (2003). Network formation with heterogenous agents. Economics Working Paper Archive Econ-WPA, Microeconomics series, No. 0301002.

Galeotti, A., S. Goyal and J. Kamphorst (2006). Network formation with heterogeneous player. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), 353–372.

Petrosyan, L.A. and A. Sedakov (2014). Multistage network games with perfect information. Automation and Remote Control, 75(8), 1532–1540.

Aumann, R.J. and R. Myerson (2003). ndogenous formation of links between players and of coalitions: An application of the Shapley value. Networks and Groups. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 207–220.

Myerson, R. (1977). Graphs and cooperation in games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, 225–229.

Shapley, L.S. (1953). A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games, 2(28), 307–317.

Downloads

Published

2022-03-08

How to Cite

Sun, P., & Parilina, E. (2022). Two-Stage Network Formation Game with Heterogeneous Players and Private Information. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 12. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13033

Issue

Vol. 12 (2019)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.