On Competition in the Telecommunications Market

Petr  Ageev; Yaroslavna Pankratova; Svetlana Tarashnina

Authors

Petr Ageev Saint Petersburg State University
Yaroslavna Pankratova Saint Petersburg State University
Svetlana Tarashnina Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

The paper investigates the process of competition in the market of telecommunication services between three firms: the leader, the challenger and the follower. In this work we construct a model of competition between three players in the form of a multistage non-zero sum game. As a solution of the game we find a subgame perfect equilibrium. We illustrate the results with an example for three companies working on the Saint-Petersburg telecommunications market.

Keywords:

telecommunications market, non-zero sum game, multistage game, subgame perfect equilibrium

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