Constructive and Blocking Powers in Some Applications

Authors

  • Svetlana Tarashnina Saint Petersburg State University
  • Nadezhda Smirnova Higher School of Economics

Abstract

We investigate the prenucleolus, the anti-prenucleolus and the
SM-nucleolus in glove market games and weighted majority games. This
kind of games looks desirable for considering solution concepts taking into
account the blocking power of a coalition S with different weights. Analytical
formulae for calculating the solutions are presented for glove market
game. Influence of the blocking power on players’ payoffs is discussed and
the examples which demonstrate similarities and differences comparing with
other solution concepts are given.

Keywords:

cooperative TU-game, solution concept, prenucleolus, SM-nucleolus, constructive and blocking power, glove market game, weighted majority game

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References

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Published

2022-04-17

How to Cite

Tarashnina, S., & Smirnova, N. (2022). Constructive and Blocking Powers in Some Applications. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 10. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13267

Issue

Vol. 10 (2017)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.