Dynamic Cournot Oligopoly Models of the State Promotion of Innovative Electronic Courses in Universities
Abstract
We built and investigated a two-level dynamic game theoretic
model of control of the state promotion of innovative electronic courses in
universities based on Cournot oligopoly. A federal state is the Principal, and
universities competing a la Cournot are agents. The agents invest in the
development of new electronic educative courses that is considered as their
innovative investments. The Principal gives subsidies to the agents for the
promotion of innovations. The agents play a dynamic game in normal form
that results in a Nash equilibrium, and the Principal solves an inverse Stackelberg game (a Germeier game of the type Γ2t). We investigated different types of strategies: (1) uniform strategies for all agents; (2) type-dependent
(agent efficiency-dependent) strategies; (3) action-dependent strategies. For
a specific form of the model functions we found a solution in explicit form,
and in the general case we used a method of qualitatively representative
scenarios in simulation modeling. We analyzed the results by means of the
individual and collective relative efficiency indices.
Keywords:
Cournot oligopoly, inverse dynamic Stackelberg games, simulation modeling, university management
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
