Solution of the Meeting Time Choice Problem for n Persons

Authors

  • Vladimir V. Yashin Institute of Applied Mathematical Research of Karelian Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22

Abstract

We consider a game-theoretic model of negotiations of n persons about a meeting time. The problem is to determine the time of the meeting, with the consensus of all players required to make a final decision. The solution is found by backward induction in the class of stationary strategies. Players' wins are represented by piecewise linear functions having one peak. An subgame perfect equilibrium for the problem in the case of δ ≤ 1/2 is found in analytical form.

Keywords:

optimal timing, linear utility functions, sequential bargaining, Rubinstein bargaining model, subgame perfect equilibrium, stationary strategies, backward induction

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References

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Mazalov, V. V. and Yashin, V. V. (2022). Equilibrium in the problem of choosing the meeting time for N persons. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Applied Mathematics.Computer Science. Control Processes (to appear)

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Published

2023-01-27

How to Cite

Yashin, V. V. (2023). Solution of the Meeting Time Choice Problem for n Persons. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15, 303–310. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.22

Issue

Vol. 15 (2022)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.