An Axiomatization of the Myerson Value
Abstract
TU-games with communication structure are cooperative games with transferable utility where the cooperation between players is limited by a communication structure represented by a graph on the set of players. On this class of games, the Myerson value is one of the most well-known solutions and it is the Shapley value of the so-called restricted game. In this study we give another form of fairness axiom on the class of TU-games with communication structure so that the Myerson value is uniquely characterized by this fainess axiom with (component) efficiency, a kind of null player property and additivity. The combination is similar to the original characterization of the Shapley value.
Keywords:
Cooperative TU-games, communication structure, Myerson value, Shapley value
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.