Dynamic Games with Incomplete Knowledge in Metric Spaces

Authors

  • Igor Konnov Kazan Federal University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.09

Abstract

We describe a model of a discrete time dynamic system with active elements (players) and states in a metric space. Each state is associated with the common utility value and player shares. Coalitions of players can change the system state, but each move requires their expenses. The players may have only restricted and local knowledge about the system. We define the concept of an equilibrium state in this dynamic game and present iterative algorithms that create feasible trajectories tending to equilibrium states under rather general conditions.

Keywords:

dynamic games, discrete time, incomplete knowledge, utility shares distributions, equilibrium states, solution trajectories

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References

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Konnov, I. V. (2019). Equilibrium formulations of relative optimization problems. Mathem. Meth. Oper. Res. 90, 137–152

Konnov, I. V. (2021). A general class of relative optimization problems. Mathem. Meth. Oper. Res. 93, 501–520

Mazalov, V. V. (2010). Mathematical Game Theory and Applications. Lan', St. Petersburg

Okuguchi, K. and Szidarovszky, F. (1990). The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-product Firms. Springer-Verlag, Berlin

Peters, H. (2015). Game Theory. Springer-Verlag, Berlin

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Published

2023-01-26

How to Cite

Konnov, I. (2023). Dynamic Games with Incomplete Knowledge in Metric Spaces. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15, 109–120. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.09

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Section

Articles