A Construction of Preference Relation for Models of Decision Making with Quality Criteria

Authors

  • Victor V. Rozen Saratov State University

Abstract

We consider a problem of construction of preference relations for models of decision making with quality criteria. A quality criterion one means as a function from a set of alternatives in some chain (i.e. linearly ordered set). A system of axioms for rule of preferences is given. It is shown that any rule for preferences satisfying these axioms can be presented as a rule for preferences based on some pseudofilter of winning coalitions of criteria. The section 4 contains main results of the article. In particular, necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive and for linear preferences are found. An interpretation of Arrow paradox in terms of filters is given.

Keywords:

Rule for preference relations, Axiom for preferences, Pseudofilters and filters of winning coalitions

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References

Birkhoff, G. (1967). Lattice theory. Amer. Math. Soc., Coll. Publ., Vol. 25.

Kelley, J. (1957). General topology. D. Van Nostrand Comp., Princeton, New Jersey.

Kuratowsski, K. and A. Mostowski (1967). Set theory. North-Holland Publ. Comp. Amsterdam.

Moulin, H. (1981). Theory of games for economics and politics. Hermann, Paris.

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Published

2022-08-22

How to Cite

Rozen, V. V. . (2022). A Construction of Preference Relation for Models of Decision Making with Quality Criteria. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 6. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/14236

Issue

Vol. 6 (2013)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.