Game-Theoretic Models of Collaboration among Economic Agents

Abstract

In present article are considered the models explaining the mechanisms of emergence and development of situations, in which it is appropriate for economic agents to collaborate and act together despite of having independent goals. The main attention is concentrated to different approaches to definition of concept of equilibrium for model of collaboration of two agents.

The work is devoted to problems in the study of economic instruments, inducing the agents, which initially have independent and uncoordinated systems of goals to commission any beneficial actions. Particularly, we consider an interaction of economic agents when each of them may take the actions, that bring benefit to other. Stimulus to "positive" behavior each agent is a waiting counter actions, that will be useful for him. To identify this class of situations it is proposed to use the term "collaboration". In a model of collaboration between two economic agents is proposed version to express of mixed strategies of players in the form of continuous distribution, which enabled us to formulate two alternative approaches of equilibrium: based on the criterion of minimizing variance of utility of participants and based on the criterion of minimizing of VaR.

Keywords:

Game theory, collaboration, Nash equilibrium, value at risk (VaR), quantile