Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level

Authors

  • Pavel V. Konyukhovskiy Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Institute of Economics and Management, 48 Moika Embankment, St.Petersburg, 191186, Russia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2940-1049
  • Victoria V. Holodkova Saint-Petersburg State University, Faculty of Economic, Department of Cybernetic Economic 13B Universitetskaya Emb., St.Petersburg 199034, Russia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1523-8412

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.15

Abstract

The main attention is focused on the application of the methods of the theory of cooperative games to the analysis of the relationship between the leading actors in international politics, or, as they say, the centers of power. One of the specific features of the modern world is the "triple type" of conflicts. Namely, at different levels of relationships, conflict situations with three participants (players) are often observed. Such situations are objectively characterized by the formation of possible paired coalitions, rejecting the third. The main idea of the proposed approach is the transition from cooperative games with deterministic values of characteristic functions to their counterparts with stochastic values. One of the possible concepts of solutions for stochastic cooperative games is associated with the extension of the ideas of the bargaining set to them. Problems of development and interpretation of this concept in the case of a triple conflict of international centers of power. An essential advantage of this approach is the possibility of meaningful interpretations of the significance level, at which the conditions for the rationality of the shares of the players should be ensured, taking into account the non-determinism of their utilities given by the characteristic function.

Keywords:

game theory, cooperative games, stochastic cooperative games, bargaining set, intercountry interaction, centers of power

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
 

References

Aleskerov, F. T., Kravchenko, A. S. (2008). The distribution of influence in the government of the Russian Empire Dumas. Politeia, 3(50)

Aumann, R. J., Maschler, M. (1961). The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Econometric Research Program Research Memorandum No. 34, 6 November 1961

Banzhaf, J. F. (1965). Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review., 19, 317–343

Blagden, D. (2019). Power, polarity, and prudence: the ambiguities and implications of UK discourse on a multipolar international system. Defence Studies. Published online. DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2019.1643243

Charnes, A. and D. Granot (1977). Coalitional and Chance-Constrained Solutions to n-Person Games, II: Two-Stage Solutions. Operation Research 25(6), 1013–1019

Charnes, A., Granot, D. (1973). Prior solutions: extensions of convex nucleolus solutions to chance-constrained games. In: Proceedings of the Computer Science and Statistics Seventh Symposium at Iowa University. pp. 1013–1019

Coleman, J. S. (1971). Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act. In: B. Lieberman (ed.) Social Choice, New York: Gordon and Breach, pp. 269–300

Deegan, J., Packel, E. W. (1978). A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games. In: International Journal of Game Theory, 7(2)

Degterev, D. A. (2020). Assessment of the current balance of power in the international arena and the formation of a multipolar world. M .: Ru-science. (https://ru-science.com/ru)

Holler, M. J., Packel, E. W. (1983). Power, Luck and the Right Index. In: Journal of Economics, 43

Johnston, R. J. (1978). On the Measurement of Power: Some Reactions to Laver. In: Environment and Planning., 10

Keersmaeker, G. (2015). Multipolar Myths and Unipolar Fantasies. In: Security Policy Brief No 60. Brussels, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations

Konyukhovskiy, P. V. (2012). The use of stochastic cooperative games in the justification of investment projects. In: Vestnik St.Petersburg University. Ser.5 Economy, 4, 134–143

Konyukhovskiy, P. V., Holodkova, V. V. (2017). Application of Game Theory in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International level. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management., Vol X

Pechersky, S. L., Yanovskaya, E. B. (2004). Cooperative Games: solutions and axioms. SPb.: Publishing House of Europe University of St. Petersburg

Penrose, L. S. (1946). The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 109, 53–57

Rae, D. W. (1969). Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice. American Political Science Review, 63, 40–63

Raymind, G. V. (2018). Advocating the rules-based order in an era of multipolarity. Australian Journal of International Affairs. Published online. DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2018.1520803

Schmeidler, D. (1969). The nucleolus of a characteristic function game SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 17(6), 1163–1170

Shapley, L., Shubik, M. A. (1954). Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System. American Political Science Review, 3 Vol. 48

Sokolova, A. V. (2008). Quantitative methods of assessing the impact of participating in the collective decision-making 51 Politeia 4

Suijs, J., Born, P. (1999). Stochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents. Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 331–345

Suijs J. P. M. (1999). A nucleolus for stochastic operative games. In J.P.M. Suijs (Ed.), Cooperative Decision-Making Under Risk. 1999. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 152–181

Trush, S. M. (2020). RUSSIA-USA-CHINA: Resons and Risks of the Russian-Chinese Military Relationship. Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 90(11), 1037–1047

Yeung, D. W. K., Petrosyan, L. A. (2006). Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games. Springer, 2006

Yeung, D. W. K., Petrosyan, L. A. (2004). Subgame consistent cooperative solutions in stochastic differential games. J.Optimiz. Theory and Appl., 120(3), 651–666

Downloads

Published

2021-10-30

How to Cite

Konyukhovskiy, P. V., & Holodkova, V. V. (2021). Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 14, 192–215. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.15

Issue

Vol. 14 (2021)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.

Most read articles by the same author(s)