Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games
Abstract
We deal with the linkage of infinitely repeated games. Results are obtained by analysing the relations between the feasible individually rational payoff regions of the isolated games and the linked game. In fact we have to handle geometric problems related to Minkowski sums, intersections and Pareto boundaries of convex sets.
Keywords:
asymmetries, convex set, feasible individually rational payoff region, Folk theorem, full cooperation, linking, Minkowski sum, Pareto boundary, tensor game
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
