Joint Venture's Dynamic Stability with Application to the Renault-Nissan Alliance

Authors

  • Nikolay A. Zenkevich Saint Petersburg State University
  • Anastasia F. Koroleva Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

The cooperative dynamic stochastic multistage game of joint venture is considered. We suggest a payoff distribution procedure (PDP), which defines a time consistent imputation. Based on the results obtained, we conduct a retrospective analysis of dynamic stability of the Renault-Nissan alliance. It is shown that partners within the alliance have divided their cooperative payoffs according to the suggested PDP.

Keywords:

strategic alliance, joint venture, dynamic stochastic cooperative games, dynamic stability, normalized share

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References

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

A. Zenkevich, N., & F. Koroleva, A. (2022). Joint Venture’s Dynamic Stability with Application to the Renault-Nissan Alliance. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13627

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