Stable Cooperation in Graph-Restricted Games

Authors

  • Elena Parilina Saint Petersburg State University
  • Artem Sedakov Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

In the paper we study stable coalition structures in the games with restrictions on players' cooperation and communication. Restriction on cooperation among players is given by a coalition structure, whereas restriction on their communication is described by a graph. Having both a coalition structure and a graph fixed, a payoff distribution can be calculated based on worth of each coalition of players. We use the concept of stability for a coalition structure similar to Nash stability, assuming that the graph structure is fixed. The results are illustrated with examples.

Keywords:

cooperation, coalition structure, graph, characteristic function, stability, Shapley value, Myerson value, ES-value

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References

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

Parilina, E., & Sedakov, A. (2022). Stable Cooperation in Graph-Restricted Games. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13613

Issue

Vol. 7 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.

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