Pricing in Queueing Systems M/M/m with Delays

Authors

  • Anna V. Melnik Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

A non-cooperative m-person game which is related to the queueing system MMm is considered. There are n competing transport companies which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution with parameters µ ii=1,2,..., m respectively. The stream forms the Poisson process with intensity λ. The problem of pricing and determining the optimal intensity for each player in the competition is solved.

Keywords:

Duopoly, equilibrium prices, queueing system

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References

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

V. Melnik, A. (2022). Pricing in Queueing Systems M/M/m with Delays. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13604

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