Cooperation in Transportation Game
Abstract
We consider a game-theoretic model of competition and cooperation of transport companies on a graph. First, a non-cooperative n-person game which is related to the queueing system M= M= n is considered. There are n competing transport companies which serve the stream of passengers with exponential distribution of time with parameters µ ( i), i = 1,2,..., n respectively on the graph of routes. The stream of passengers from a stop k to another stop t forms the Poisson process with intensity λ kt . The transport companies announce the prices for the service on each route and the passengers choose the service with minimal costs. The incoming stream λ kt is divided into n Poisson flows with intensities λ ( i) kt , i = 1,2,..., n. The problem of pricing for each player in the competition and cooperation is solved.
Keywords:
Duopoly, equilibrium prices, queueing system
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.