Differential Games of R&D Competition with Switching Dynamics

Authors

  • Xiyue Huang Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

This paper investigates a differential game model of R&D competition, starting with a two-stage structure and then extending this structure to a generalized multi-stage model.The two-stage model captures distinct efficiency dynamics, and the Nash equilibrium analysis reveals optimal strategies for resource allocation. The multi-stage extension generalizes these insights, providing a broader view of firms’ strategic adjustments. The study identifies these key properties: the consistent ratio of control efforts across different stages, the structural uniformity of Nash equilibrium strategies, and the continuity of these properties in multi-stage scenarios. These findings enhance the understanding of strategic behavior in competitive innovation environments.

Keywords:

differetial game, R&D competition, optimal control

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References

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Published

2025-04-18

How to Cite

Huang, X. (2025). Differential Games of R&D Competition with Switching Dynamics. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 17, 38–50. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/21400

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