Simulating Opinion Dynamics in Scale-Free Networks with Strategic Influence
Abstract
In this study, we investigate an opinion dynamics game with active and passive agents. Using a well-established framework for opinion dynamics, we formulate the problem as a linear-quadratic game with active agents competing for opinions. Our analysis focuses on the Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, under the assumption that active agents strategically select their actions throughout the game to minimize their individual costs. This paper places significant emphasis on numerical modeling to illustrate opinion dynamics. We aim to demonstrate how varying parameters impact opinions of passive agents and costs of active agents in the Nash equilibrium.
Keywords:
social networks, opinion dynamics, Nash equilibrium
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
