Symmetric Nash Equilibrium Arrivals to Queuing System
Abstract
We consider a game-theoretic setting for the queuing system
models where input process of arrivals is strategic. This paper generalizes
a methodology for the symmetric Nash equilibrium exploring in queuing
system with loss. We assume that the system admits customer requests at
the time interval [0, T]. Each of customers chooses the moment to send his
request into the system maximizing his payoff. Several models of certain systems are presented as examples demonstrating a result of the methodology application.
Keywords:
Queueing system, Strategic customers, Optimal arrivals, Kolmogorov backward equations, Nash equilibrium
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.