Principles of Stable Cooperation in Stochastic Games
Abstract
The paper considers stochastic games in the class of stationary strategies. The cooperative form of this class of stochastic games is constructed. The cooperative solution is found. Conditions of dynamic stability for stochastic games are obtained. Principles of dynamic stability include three conditions: subgame consistency, strategic stability and irrational behavior proof condition of the cooperative agreement. Also the paper considers the example for which the cooperative agreement is found and the conditions of dynamic stability are checked.
Keywords:
cooperative stochastic game, stationary strategies, time consistency, subgame consistency, payoff distribution procedure, strategic stability, irrational behavior proof condition
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.