Pricing and Transportation Costs in Queueing System
Abstract
A non-cooperative four-person game which is related to the queueing system M/M/2 is considered. There are two competing stores and two competing transport companies which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution with parameters μ 1 and μ 2 respectively. The stream forms the Poisson process with intensity λ. The problem of pricing and determining the optimal intensity for each player in the competition is solved.
Keywords:
Duopoly, equilibrium prices, queueing system
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References
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
