Consistency to the Values for Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
Abstract
In the classical game space, Evans (1996) introduced a procedure, such that the solution of a game determined endogenously as the expected outcome of a reduction of the game to a two-person bargaining problem, is just the Shapley value. This approach is not suitable for games in generalized characteristic function form, in which the order of players entering into the game affects the worth of coalitions. Based on Evans's approach, in this paper we propose a new procedure which induces the generalized Shapley value defined by Sanchez and Bergantinos (1997). Moreover, this generalized procedure can be adapted to characterize the class of values satisfying efficiency, linearity and symmetry, for games in generalized characteristic function form.
Keywords:
cooperative game, orders, value, consistency, procedure
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