Strictly Strong (N-1)-equilibrium in N-person Multicriteria Games

Authors

  • Denis V. Kuzyutin Saint Petersburg State University
  • Mariya V. Nikitina International Banking Institute
  • Yaroslavna B. Pankratova Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

Using some specific approach to the coalition-consistency analysis in n-person multicriteria games we introduce two refinements of (weak Pareto) equilibria: the strong and strictly strong (n−1)-equilibriums. Axiomatization of the strictly strong (n−1)-equilibria (on closed families of multicriteria games) is provided in terms of consistency, strong one-person rationality, suitable variants of Pareto optimality and converse consistency axiom and others.

Keywords:

multicriteria games, Pareto equilibria, strong equilibrium, consistency, axiomatizations

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References

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

V. Kuzyutin, D., V. Nikitina, . M., & B. Pankratova, Y. (2022). Strictly Strong (N-1)-equilibrium in N-person Multicriteria Games. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13601

Issue

Vol. 7 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.