On Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Authors

  • Michael Finus University of Bath, Department of Economics
  • Pierre von Mouche Wageningen Universiteit
  • Bianca Rundshagen Universität Hagen

Abstract

For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditionsfor existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.

Keywords:

Coalition formation, Cournot oligopoly, equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, game in strategic form, public good

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References

Bartl, D. (2012). Application of cooperative game solution concepts to a collusive oligopoly game. In School of Business Administration in Karviná, editor, Proceedings of the 30th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics, pages 14–19.

Bloch, F. (2003). Non–cooperative models of coalition formation in games with spillovers. In C. Carraro, editor, Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 2, pages 35–79. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (2009). Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games. Social Choice and Welfare, 32(0), 389–406.

Folmer, H. and P. H. M. von Mouche (2004). On a less known Nash equilibrium uniqueness result. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 28(0), 67–80.

Tan, K. J. Yu, and X. Yuan (1995). Existence theorems of Nash equilibria for non-cooperative n-person games. International Journal of Game Theory, 24(0), 217–222.

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

Finus, M., von Mouche, . P., & Rundshagen, B. (2022). On Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13591

Issue

Vol. 7 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.