On Monotonicity of the SM-nucleolus and the α-nucleolus
Abstract
In this paper two single-valued solution concepts of a TU-game with a finite set of players, the SM-nucleolus and the α-nucleolus, are considered. Based on the procedure of finding lexicographical minimum, there was proposed an algorithm allowing to calculate the SM-nucleolus as well as the prenucleolus. This algorithmis modified to calculatethe α-nucleolus for any fixed α ∈ [0,1]. Using this algorithm the monotonicity properties of the SM-nucleolus and the α-nucleolus are studied by means of counterexamples.
Keywords:
cooperative TU-game, solution concept, aggregate and coalitional monotonicity, the SM-nucleolus, the α-nucleolus
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.