Game-theoretical Approach for CEO Incentive Mechanism Improvement
Abstract
In the paper is investigated the problem of CEO compensation value modeling. The goal of the paper is improving the mechanism of forming the variable part of CEO compensation and test the applicability of the mechanism on international public companies. For this purpose in the paper is solved the following tasks: based on the scientific literature is substantiated the requirements for the mechanism of forming the variable part of compensation; is analyzed CEO compensation value and practice of forming the variable part of compensation on example of international public companies in specific industries; is improved the game-theoretical model of forming the variable part of CEO compensation; is carry out a comparative analysis of the results of theoretical modeling and practice of forming the variable part of the CEO compensation in international public companies in IT and retail industries.
Keywords:
corporate governance, agency problem, CEO compensation, optimal contracting, compensation structure and value, game-theoretical modeling
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.