Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for Two-stage Network Games
Abstract
In this paper, two-stage network games are studied. At first stage of the game players form a network, while at second stage they choose strategies according to the network realized at the first stage. However, there are two kinds of two-stage networks. The first is a special class of two-stage network games when players have the opportunity to revised their network which they formed before. And the second is classical two-stage network. Cooperative setting is considered. In the cooperative case, we use Nash Bargaining Solution as a solution concept. It is demonstrated that the Nash Bargaining Solution satisfies the time consistency property for the special class of two-stage network game. But its not true for a classical two-stage network game.
Keywords:
network, time-consistency, Nash Bargaining solution
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.