Stochastic n-person Prisoner's Dilemma: the Time-Consistency of Core and Shapley Value
Abstract
A cooperative finite-stage dynamic n-person prisoner's dilemma is considered. The time-consistent subset of the core is proposed. The the Shapley value for the stochastic model of the n-person prisoner's dilemma is calculated in explicit form.
Keywords:
n-person prisoner's dilemma, coalition, dynamic game, core, Shapley value, time consistency
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References
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Published
2022-02-16
How to Cite
Grinikh, A. L. (2022). Stochastic n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma: the Time-Consistency of Core and Shapley Value. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 12. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/12906
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
