Models of Optimal Control in Tullock Rent-Seeking Game

Authors

  • Denis N. Fedyanin V.A.Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2020.07

Abstract

The paper constructs and investigates the models of the optimal control in the Tullock rent-seeking game. There are two types of control in the paper: an unlimited, but expensive resource, and a cheap, but an infinitely small resource. Before the game starts, players discuss parameters of the game, and then choose their strategies simultaneously and independently, competing for better rent. We consider two types of players and two types of communication and analyze combinations.

Keywords:

optimal control, Tullock rent-seeking game, parametrized equilibrium, beliefs

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References

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Published

2022-02-02

How to Cite

Fedyanin, D. N. (2022). Models of Optimal Control in Tullock Rent-Seeking Game. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 13. https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2020.07

Issue

Vol. 13 (2020)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.