Consistent Subsolutions of the Least Core

Authors

  • Elena B. Yanovskaya St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The least core, a well-known solution concept in TU games setting, satisfies many properties used in axiomatizations of TU game solutions: it is efficient, anonymous, covariant, possesses shift-invariance, and max-invariance. However, it is not consistent thought the prenucleolus, that is consistent, is contained in it. Therefore, the least core may contain other consistent subsolutions. Since the union of consistent in the sense of Davis- Maschler solutions is also consistent, there should exist the unique maximal under inclusion consistent subsolution of the least core. In the paper we present and characterize this solution.

Keywords:

Cooperative game, least core, prekernel, consistency

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References

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Published

2023-01-25

How to Cite

Yanovskaya, E. B. (2023). Consistent Subsolutions of the Least Core. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5, 321–333. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/14635

Issue

Vol. 5 (2012)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.