On Voluntariness of Nash Equilibrium

Authors

  • Paolo Caravani University of L’Aquila

Abstract

The paper deals with pure strategy equilibria of bi-matrix games. It is argued that the set of Nash equilibria can contain voluntary as well as involuntary outcomes. Only the former are indicative of consistent expectations. In the context of repeated play with incomplete information, simulations show that involuntary equilibria tend to occur more frequently than voluntary equilibria. Consequences in econometric practice and philosophical implications are briefly hinted at.

Keywords:

matrix games, expectations, pure equilibria, learning, incomplete information

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References

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Published

2023-01-25

How to Cite

Caravani, P. (2023). On Voluntariness of Nash Equilibrium. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5, 73–82. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/14305

Issue

Vol. 5 (2012)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.