The Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for Linear-Quadratic Discrete-time Dynamic Games with Nontransferable Payoffs
Abstract
The paper considers linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs. Pareto-optimal solution is studied as optimality principle. The time consistency and irrational behavior proof condition of this solution are investigated. As an example, the government debt stabilization game is considered.
Keywords:
linear-quadratic games, discrete-time games, games with nontransferable payoffs, Pareto-optimal solution, time consistency, PDP, irrational behavior proof condition
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.