Competition Form of Bargaining

Authors

  • Tatyana E. Nosalskaya Zabaikalsky Institute of Railway Transport

Abstract

We consider the noncooperative zero-sumgame, related with the competitions. Players submit the competition projects, that are characterized by a finite set of parameters. The arbitrator or arbitration committee uses a stochastic procedure with the probability distribution to determine the most preferred project. This distribution is known to all participants. Payoff ot the winner depend on the parameters of his project. The three-dimensional mathematical model of this problem is constructed, which is then extended to the multi-dimensional case. The equilibria in the games with four and n persons are found, as well as the corresponding payoffs are computed.

Keywords:

Model of competition, bargaining, stochastic procedure, n-person game, Nash equilibrium

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References

Mazalov, V. V. (2010). Mathematical Came Theory and Applications. — St. Peterburg, 448 p.(in Russian).

Mazalov, V. V., Mentcher, A. E., Tokareva, J. S. (2012) Negotiations. Mathematical Theory — St. Petersburg — Moscow — Krasnodar, 304 p. (in Russian).

Mazalov, V. V., Tokareva, J. S. (2010). Game-Theoretic Models of Tender’s Design. Mathematical Came Theory and its Applications, Vol. 2, 2, 66–78. (in Russian).

De Berg, M., Van Kreveld, M., Overmars, M., Schwarzkopf, O. (2000). Computational Geometry. Springer.

Kilgour, M. (1994) Game-Theoretic Properties of Final-Offer Arbitration. Group Decision and Negotiation, 3, 285–301.

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

E. Nosalskaya, T. (2022). Competition Form of Bargaining. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13611

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