A Problem of Purpose Resource Use in Two-Level Control Systems

Authors

  • Olga I. Gorbaneva Southern Federal University
  • Guennady A. Ougolnitsky Southern Federal University

Abstract

The system including two level players–top and bottom–is considered in the paper. Each of the players have public (purpose) and private (non-purpose) interests. Both players take part of payoff from purpose resource use. The model of resource allocation among the purpose and non-purpose using is investigated for different payoff function classes and for three public gain distribution types. A problem is presented in the form of hierarchical game where the Stackelberg equilibrium is found.

Keywords:

resource allocation, two-level control system, purpose use, non-purpose resource use, Stackelberg equilibrium

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References

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Gorbaneva, O. and Ougolnitsky, G. (2013). Purpose and Non-Purpose Resource Use Models in Two-Level Control Systems. Advances in Systems Science and Application, 13(4), 378–390 (in Russian).

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

I. Gorbaneva, O., & A. Ougolnitsky, G. (2022). A Problem of Purpose Resource Use in Two-Level Control Systems. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13593

Issue

Vol. 7 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.