On the Inverse Problem and the Coalitional Rationality for Binomial Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games

Authors

  • Irinel Dragan University of Texas

Abstract

In an earlier work (Dragan, 1991), we introduced the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Values and Weighted Shapley Values of cooperative transferable utilities games (TU-games). A more recent work (Dragan, 2004) is solving the Inverse Problem for Semivalues, a more general class of values of TU games. The Binomial Semivalues have been introduced recently (Puerte, 2000), and they are particular Semivalues, including among other values the Banzhaf Value. The Inverse problem for Binomial Semivalues was considered in another paper (Dragan, 2013). As these are, in general, not efficient values, the main tools in evaluating the fairness of such solutions are the Power Game and the coalitional rationality, as introduced in the earlier joint work (Dragan/Martinez-Legaz, 2001). In the present paper, we are looking for the existence of games belonging to the Inverse Set, and for which the a priori given Binomial Semivalue is coalitional rational, that is belongs to the Core of the Power Game. It is shown that there are games in the Inverse Set for which the Binomial Semivalue is coalitional rational, and also games for which it is not coalitional rational. An example is illustrating the procedure of finding games in the Inverse Set belonging to both classes of games just mentioned.

Keywords:

Inverse Problem, Inverse Set, Semivalues, Binomial Semivalues, Power Game, Coalitional rationality

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References

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Dragan, I. (1991). The potential basis and the weighted Shapley value. Libertas Mathematica, 11, 139–150.

Dragan, I. (1996). New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value. E.J.O.R., 95, 451–463.

Dragan, I. and Martinez-Legaz, J. E. (2001). On the Semivalues and the Power Core of cooperative TU games. IGTR, 3, 2&3, 127–139.

Dragan, I. (2004). On the inverse problem for Semivalues of cooperative TU Games. IJPAM, 4, 545–561.

Dragan, I. (2013). On the Inverse Problem for Binomial Semivalue. Proc. GDN2013 Conference, Stockholm, 191–198.

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Puente, M. A. (2000). Contributions to the representability of simple games and to the calculus of solutions for this class of games. Ph.D.Thesis, University of Catalonya, Barcelona, Spain.

Freixas, J., and Puente, M. A., (2002). Reliability importance measures of the components in a system based upon semivalues and probabilistic values. Ann.,O.R., 109, 331–342.

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Published

2022-08-09

How to Cite

Dragan, I. (2022). On the Inverse Problem and the Coalitional Rationality for Binomial Semivalues of Cooperative TU Games. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13589

Issue

Vol. 7 (2014)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.