Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: Game-Theoretic Analysis
Abstract
This paper discusses results on Nash equilibrium and its refinements for several variants of the architecture for oligopolistic markets of homogeneous goods. For different kinds of one-stage and two-stage auctions, we compare the game-theoretic solution with the competitive equilibrium and estimate the loss of social welfare due to producers’ market power. We conclude on the optimal architecture of the market.
Keywords:
Game theory, auctions, market power, social welfare
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Published
2022-05-02
How to Cite
Vasin, A., & Kartunova, P. (2022). Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: Game-Theoretic Analysis. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13468
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Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
