Multistage Game Model with Time-claiming Alternatives

Authors

  • Ovanes L. Petrosian Saint Petersburg State University
  • Levon K. Babadzhanjanz Saint Petersburg State University

Abstract

The new model of multistage game with perfect information, on aclosed time interval is considered. On each stage of the game player chooses one of the alternatives and time to perform them. The payoffs depend upon trajectory and the time, at which game terminates. As a solution of this game subgame perfect ε - Nash equilibrium is taken.

Keywords:

Perfect information, Nash equilibrium, Time-claiming alternative

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References

Petrosyan, L., Zenkevich, N. (1996). Game Theory. World Scientific Publisher.

Papayoanou, P. (2010). Game Theory of Business. Probalistic Publishing.

Reinhard, S. (1998). Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames. Theory and Decision, Springer, 44, 1–36.

Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 284–295.

Kuhn, H. (1953). Extensive games and problems of information. Contributions to the theory of games, 2, 193–216.

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Published

2022-05-24

How to Cite

Petrosian, O. L., & Babadzhanjanz, L. K. (2022). Multistage Game Model with Time-claiming Alternatives. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8. Retrieved from https://gametheory.spbu.ru/article/view/13463

Issue

Vol. 8 (2015)

Section

Articles

License

Articles of "Contributions to Game Theory and Management" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.