Nash Bargaining Solution as Negotiation Concept for Resource Allocation Problem with Groves-Ledyard Mechanism

Nikolay A. Korgin; Vsevolod O. Korepanov

doi:10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16

Authors

Nikolay A. Korgin V.A.Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences Profsoyuznaya st. 65, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Vsevolod O. Korepanov V.A.Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences Profsoyuznaya st. 65, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2968-5192

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.16

Abstract

Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bargaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of the Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensusended games show light attraction to the Nash bargaining solution, it's less than we obtained in games with the mechanism of Yang-Hajek from another class of so-called proportional allocation mechanisms. We discuss differences of consensus-ended games from timeout-ended games, what decisions lead to the situations with the Nash bargaining value increasing and differences between balanced mechanism Groves-Ledyard and unbalanced mechanism Yang-Hajek.

Keywords:

resource allocation mechanisms, Nash implementation, Nash bargaining solution, Groves-Ledyard mechanism

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References

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